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St. Louis: Competing Visions

Occurring at the dawn of what would become the most violent and dynamic century in
world history, the cataclysmic Great War brought cultural, social, economic, and political
devastation to some of the world’s most powerful societies. Following the armistice of
November 1918, a peace conference convened in Paris. There, borders were redrawn in an
attempt to bring stability and peace to the wealthy, self-adulating continent that had torn itself
to shreds. However necessary and welcome the peace talks were in 1919, the resultant Treaty
of Versailles has been the subject of great scrutiny and vehement criticism for decades since
its creation. Historians have portrayed it ad nauseum as a vindictive settlement that would
sow the seeds for the later ascendancy of fascism in Germany and Italy. Flawed though the
postwar arrangements certainly were, an investigation into how European and American
leaders sought to legitimate their hopes for the postwar world – namely, by constructing
arguments on how the war itself should be remembered – is crucial for understanding the
outbreak of an even more violent war two decades later.
Such a fascinating intersection of memory and politics leaves the historian with
several burning questions. First, to what extent did political and diplomatic officials of the
interwar period justify their proposals for the peacetime international structure by offering
their own interpretations of how the First World War should be remembered? Second, in
what ways were these suggested remembrances similar or different, and how did these
similarities or differences lead the aforementioned figures to the pursuit of different goals for
the world after the Great War? Third, did one particular vision or general concept emerge
triumphant among competing constructions of memory on the lasting political significance of
the war? If so, did this contribute to the weak enforcement of international agreements made
at Versailles during the interwar period?
This paper argues that officials at the Paris Peace Conference, in the White House,
and in the U.S. Congress strove for the realization of competing visions for the postwar
world, and thus were required to construct their own interpretations of how the First World
War should be remembered, and what must be learned from it. A pervasive sense of victors’
justice dominated the proceedings in Paris, leading to the creation of a settlement which
would not find lasting support from European or American decision makers. The dubious
postwar arrangements made at Versailles would contribute to the resurgence of a
conservative isolationism that dominated U.S. foreign policy throughout the 1920s and
1930s, promoted immediately after World War I by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Indeed, it
was Lodge who opposed Woodrow Wilson’s call for international cooperation by offering a
different – and, at least in the short term, more popular – vision of how the United States
should shape its foreign policy in the aftermath of total war.
Although a rich literature on memory and World War I already exists, the focus of this
burgeoning field tends to be upon cultural constructions of memory1 rather than political
ones, likely due in part to plentiful opportunity for conducting original explorations into how
the experience and memory of war differed across lines of nationality, class, religion, gender,
and race.2 The dominance of this cultural perspective in the historiography of First World
1

An indicative (but by no means exhaustive) survey of relevant monographic literature includes the following:
George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990); Toby Thacker, British Culture and the First World War: Experience, Representation and Memory (London:
Bloomsbury, 2014); Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1997); and Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in
European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2
For example, see Janet Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Tim Grady, The German-Jewish Soldiers of the First World
War in History and Memory (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011).
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War memory has been augmented by sophisticated, multidisciplinary examinations of
material culture and the different media through which memory itself is communicated. 3 At
least three major monographs move beyond the cultural rule to some extent,4 but none of
them dedicate extensive analysis to memory as it was developed by the subjects upon which
this paper focuses: Paris Peace Conference documents and American debates thereon, Warren
Harding’s inaugural call for a “return to normalcy,” and the actions of the Nye Committee.
Therefore, this paper provides an important contribution to ongoing studies of memory, its
uses, and its abuses following the First World War.
In early 1919, the peacemakers at Paris convened the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. The very title of
the commission suggests that it was formed with an idea of which belligerent powers were
responsible for the escalation of a regional conflict in the Balkans to a war with global
consequences. The commission was used as a medium through which official statements on
German war guilt were made before the Treaty of Versailles had been completed. Beginning
the first chapter of the report presented by this commission on March 29, 19195 was the
following declaration:
On the question of the responsibility of the authors of the war, the
Commission, after having examined a number of official documents relating
to the origin of the World War, and to the violations of neutrality and of
frontiers which accompanied its inception, has determined that the
responsibility for it lies wholly upon the Powers which declared war in
pursuance of a policy of aggression, the conspiracy against the peace of
Europe.
This responsibility rests first on Germany and Austria, secondly on Turkey
and Bulgaria. The responsibility is made all the graver by reason of the
violation by Germany and Austria of the neutrality of Belgium and
Luxemburg [sic], which they themselves had guaranteed. It is increased, with
regard to both France and Serbia, by the violation of their frontiers before the
declaration of war.6
What follows in the first chapter is a narrative of just over eight pages in length 7 arguing that
Austria-Hungary, conspiring with Germany, plotted to exploit the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand as a pretext to “devour”8 Serbia. This collusion led to the outbreak of a war
in which the powers of Central Europe would find allies in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire,
thus explaining the mitigated culpability of these powers to the east.
Based on the narrative provided in the first chapter of the report and on additional
arguments, the aforementioned commission made a series of grave conclusions. The
3

See Nicholas J. Saunders, ed. Matters of Conflict: Material Culture, Memory and the First World War (London:
Routledge, 2004) and David Williams, Media, Memory, and the First World War (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2009).
4
Lisa M. Budreau, Bodies of War: World War I and the Politics of Commemoration in America, 1919-1933 (New
York: New York University Press, 2010) Adrian Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946
(London: Bloomsbury, 1994), and Steven Trout, On the Battlefield of Memory: The First World War and American
Remembrance, 1919-1941 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010).
5
“Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties,” The American
Journal of International Law 14 (No. 1, January-April 1920), 95.
6
Ibid., 98.
7
Ibid., 99-107.
8
Ibid., 100.
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commission claimed that the outbreak of the Great War was “premeditated by the Central
Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately
committed in order to make it unavoidable.”9 Additionally, “Germany, in agreement with
Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by
the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war.”10 The villainous intentions of the
Central Powers had been revealed when the “neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the treaties
of the 19th April, 1839, and that of Luxemburg [sic], guaranteed by the treaty of the 11th May,
1867, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria-Hungary.”11 Once war in Europe
was underway, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire fought “by
barbarous or illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and
the elementary laws of humanity.”12 With no representation of the Central Powers at the
conference, the vengeful sentiments that lurked alongside calls for “never again” in Paris and
throughout the world carried the day. This report – perhaps one of the first histories on the
advent of World War I written after the armistice of November 1918 – offered at best a
lopsided memory of the war’s outbreak in one of the world’s most important political venues,
and with great consequence.
Later in the year, the conclusions reached by the commission were enshrined in the
Treaty of Versailles, most infamously in the “war guilt clause,” known in official terms as
Article 231:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts
the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and
damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals
have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the
aggression of Germany and her allies.13
This clause was followed by a subsequent article, which declared that the guilt of Germany
and the other Central Powers obligated these countries to pay reparations to the war’s victors:
The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of
Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of
such resources which will resort from other provisions of the present Treaty,
to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.
The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany
undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the
civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property
during the period of belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power
against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in
general all damage [.]”14
Together, Articles 231 and 232 constitute the most widely documented instances of the Allied
Powers imposing an egregious form of victors’ justice upon the defeated Central Powers,

9

Ibid., 107.
Ibid.
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Ibid., 112.
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especially Germany.15 By assigning liability for the war’s costs upon Germany and those who
fought alongside her, the Allies exonerated themselves of responsibility for any of the
devastation caused by the war. In so doing, they conveniently used the example of the war as
fallacious proof for preconceived notions about innate German barbarism, developed well
before the outbreak of fighting and used in the trenches as motivation for Allied soldiers who
could only sustain themselves by believing in the righteousness of their cause.16 Thus, far
from providing the world with a more just and stable model of international relations, the
Treaty of Versailles constructed a memory of the Great War replete with irrational hatreds of
the past, allowing these sentiments to persist in the interwar period.
Articles 231 and 232, though widely discussed in the scholarly literature, do not by
themselves offer a complete portrayal of memory construction in the Treaty of Versailles.
Indeed, the placement of war guilt upon the Central Powers (and with an acute vehemence on
Germany) is done almost systematically in the treaty. For example, Article 31 provides
rationale for many of the punitive measures taken against Germany in subsequent articles:
Germany, recognising that the Treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status
of Belgium before the war, no longer conform to the requirements of the situation,
consents to the abrogation of said Treaties and undertakes immediately to recognise
and to observe whatever conventions may be entered into by the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, or by any of them, in concert with the governments of Belgium
and of the Netherlands, to replace the said Treaties of 1839. If her formal adhesions
should be required to such conventions or to any of their stipulations, Germany
undertakes immediately to give it.17
In other words, Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 provided rationale for the
Allied Powers to act upon their vanquished enemy in the creation of a postwar settlement. By
1919, the Allied Powers interpreted Germany’s violation of the Treaties of 1839 as an action
that rendered these treaties null and void, thereby enabling the victorious Allies to justify
themselves in creating new arrangements for postwar Europe to which Germany would be
bound.
The Allies did not hesitate to exploit this self-conferred power, making arrangements
which again relied on interpretations of historical events that bordered on abusing the power
of memory. For example, the preface to Section V of the treaty condemns “the wrong done
See, for example, Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1991), 86-87 and Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random
House, 2001), 193 for scholarly discussion on the origins and intentions of Articles 231 and 232.
16
See Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2002), 146-147: “Love of France and hatred of the enemy sustained [soldiers] and stimulated them to struggle
for a victory they considered as legitimate and therefore good. They fought with all their weapons, cultural hatred of
the adversary being among the most important. Augustin Cochin, cousin of Claude, wrote from the trenches just a
month before he died there: ‘We are for the time being lodged in the ruins of their incredible constructions of forts and
underground villages. What a race of slaves and serfs! Never would the fear of heavy shells or punishments make our
men do one tenth of this … Dreadful, dreadful race; the more we see them from close up the more we loathe them.
The bands of prisoners are revolting to see, vile, trying too hard to be liked, delighted to be caught … It is annoying to
get killed behind the parapet by such animals. They have a peculiar, powerful odour, which we can’t escape from,
living as we are on their lines, special lice, too – the famous large, iron-cross lice.’ He uttered the crucial word: race.
… The Germans’ barbarism was believed to have been substantiated as soon as they declared war and violated
Belgium’s neutrality; intellectual ‘knowledge’ of their atavism predated knowledge of the invasion. Germany at war
was a national incarnation of barbarism. The atrocities, far from being thought to reveal a specific German crime,
were considered merely to confirm pre-established convictions.”
17
Treaty of Versailles, Article 31.
15
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by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of
Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest
of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux[.]”18 In Article 51, which immediately
follows the preface, Germany was ordered to cede to France the region of Alsace-Lorraine,
which it had taken from its western neighbor in 1871 at the end of the Franco-Prussian War.19
One therefore sees a sort of diplomatic opportunism being employed by the Allied Powers to
bolster their power in Europe vis-à-vis Germany through the Treaty of Versailles. By
justifying their actions through mention of the “wrong done by Germany” in the past (this
time, in 1871 rather than in the First World War), the Allied Powers made apparent their
belief that the Treaty of Versailles was less important as a settlement officially ending the
First World War, and more important as a statement of their intentions to permanently
weaken a supposedly barbaric German nation. Thus, the Allied Powers not only constructed a
self-serving memory of World War I, but also abused memory of the losses sustained by
France in the Franco-Prussian War in order to create a postwar settlement in which Germany
was hugely disfavored.
However, it is important to note that the Treaty of Versailles was not entirely bent
toward traditional concepts of victors’ justice. To its credit, the treaty also made a serious
attempt at bringing the countries of the world together into an organization that would
provide arbitration and resolution in situations of international conflict: the League of
Nations. Article 10 of the Treaty of Versailles stated that members of the League would
“undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression
or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council [of the League] shall advise
upon the means by which this obligation is fulfilled.”20 Believing that the formation of an
effective League was the key to a more stable future, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson sought
to win the American people over to his own interpretation of how the First World War ought
to be remembered, and what could be learned from it.
Speaking in Pueblo, Colorado on September 25, 1919, Wilson explained why he was
in favor of American entry into the League of Nations. He contextualized his feelings within
remarks about the sacrifice bravely made by dead soldiers and their mothers:
What of our pledges to the men that lie dead in France? We said they went
over there not to prove the prowess of America or her readiness for another
war but to see to it that there never was such a war again … Again and again,
my fellow citizens, mothers who lost their sons in France have come to me,
and, taking my hand, have shed tears upon it … Why should they weep upon
my hand and call down the blessings of God upon me? Because they believe
that their boys died for something that vastly transcends any of the immediate
and palpable objects of the war. They believe and they rightly believe, that
their sons saved the liberty of the world.21
Wilson’s solemn words indicate that he sought to provide Americans with a memory of the
First World War imbued with special meaning that transcended contemporary ideas about the
nature of international relations. The war had been a struggle to preserve liberty in the
18

Ibid., Section V preface.
Ibid., Article 51.
20
Ibid., Article 10.
21
Woodrow Wilson, Address in Favor of the League of Nations, September 25, 1919, accessed March 15, 2014 via
the World War I Document Archive, hosted by Brigham Young University. bit.ly/TUlOh5.
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undying struggle against tyranny; the victory of liberty could only be sustained in the years to
come by taking unprecedented steps toward international unity and cooperation. Wilson
therefore sincerely believed in the ability of the League to bring about an eventual
“readjustment of those great injustices which underlie the whole structure of European and
Asiatic society.”22 Thus, his desire to ensure that United States would make a fair
contribution to world security in the aftermath of the most destructive war in history was
founded upon a belief that American internationalism would be more beneficial to the world
than traditional isolationism.
However, Wilson’s idealism was countered by the adversarial visions of Henry Cabot
Lodge, Senate Majority Leader and Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee. In his own
address on the League of Nations, delivered around six weeks before the aforementioned
Wilson speech, the Republican Lodge offered an interpretation of the war which starkly
differed from the one that would soon be given by the Democratic Wilson, his nemesis:
The independence of the United States is not only more precious to ourselves
but to the world than any single possession. Look at the United States today.
We have made mistakes in the past. We have had shortcomings. We shall
make mistakes in the future and fall short of our own best hopes. But none the
less is there any country today on the face of the earth which can compare
with this in ordered liberty, in peace, and in the largest freedom?
I feel that I can say this without being accused of undue boastfulness, for it is
the simple fact, and in making this treaty and taking on these obligations all
that we do is in a spirit of unselfishness and in a desire for the good of
mankind. But it is well to remember that we are dealing with nations every
one of which has a direct individual interest to serve, and here is grave danger
in an unshared idealism.23
Unlike Wilson, Lodge saw the key to world stability and peace in a continued tradition of
American isolationism, with the United States interfering in the conflicts of other countries
only when necessary “for the good of mankind.” While Wilson believed that the recent
memory of total war should galvanize all nations to strive for greater cooperation through the
creation of new institutions, Lodge saw the recently concluded struggle as proof of the
“unshared idealism” of the United States, which had intervened supposedly with the sole
motive of stopping the violence. In simpler terms, Wilson saw internationalism as an ideal to
be achieved, while Lodge believed American isolationism was an ideal to be protected.
Diametrically opposed at a time when American entry into the League of Nations
depended on the approval of the U.S. Senate, Lodge’s vision defeated Wilson’s in the 1920s
and 1930s, as U.S. foreign policy entered an era of conservative isolationism. American
policymakers believed that too much was at stake regarding the future of the United States to
make promises to an international organization that may or may not undermine traditional
aspects of America’s stance toward the world. For example, there was a considerable lack of
clarity provided to American legislators regarding the place that the Monroe Doctrine would
hold if the United States agreed to join the League of Nations. Article 20 of the Versailles
Treaty stated the following:

22

Ibid.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Speech on Objections to the League of Nations, August 12, 1919, accessed March 15, 2014 via
the World War I Document Archive, hosted by Brigham Young University. bit.ly/TUlOh5.
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The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as
abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent
with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter
enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any
Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have
undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it
shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release
from such obligations.24
In response to fears about the status of the Monroe Doctrine, should the U.S. approve a treaty
containing such an article, President Wilson agreed to negotiate a reservation for the doctrine
in the Treaty of Versailles.25 Article 21 therefore read as follows:
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international
engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the
Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.26
Despite the intent of Article 21 to protect the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, the article as it
is phrased contradicts the immediately preceding article. Wilson’s efforts to assuage the
concerns of the public and the Senate regarding the sanctity of the Monroe Doctrine thus
failed, contributing still more to growing support for isolationism that would make Wilson’s
illness-ridden departure from the White House a bitter one indeed.
Succeeding Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States was Republican
Warren G. Harding, who also attempted to legitimate his goals for office through an
interpretation of the significance of the Great War. Like Lodge, Harding believed the United
States to be a country that would fight for “righteousness and justice,” but could make no
commitment to do so outside “the exercise of our national sovereignty.”27 He viewed the
isolationist tradition of the United States as one that warranted continuation for the good of
the world, and especially for the good of the United States, where the success of a postwar
consumer economy depended upon a return to “normalcy”:
Our eyes never will be blind to a developing menace, our ears never deaf to
the call of civilization. We recognize the new order in the world, with the
closer contacts which progress has wrought. We sense the call of the human
heart for fellowship, fraternity, and cooperation. We crave friendship and
harbor no hate. But America, our America, the America built on the
foundation laid by the inspired fathers, can be a party to no permanent military
alliance. It can enter into no political commitments, nor assume any economic
obligations which will subject our decisions to any other than our own
authority.
…
The normal balances have been impaired, the channels of distribution have
been clogged, the relations of labor and management have been strained. We
must seek the readjustment with care and courage. Our people must give and
24

Treaty of Versailles, Article 20.
MacMillan, Paris 1919, 95-96.
26
Treaty of Versailles, Article 21.
27
Warren G. Harding, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1921, accessed March 15, 1921 via the World War I Document
Archive, hosted by Brigham Young University. bit.ly/TUlOh5.
25
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take. Prices must reflect the receding fever of war activities. Perhaps we never
shall know the old levels of wages again, because war invariably readjusts
compensations, and the necessaries of life will show their inseparable
relationship, but we must strive for normalcy to reach stability.28
With these words, Harding clearly demonstrated on the first day of his presidency that his
visions for America’s place in the postwar world were very different from those of his
predecessor. Rather than striving to promote international cooperation as a new mechanism
by which to maintain international security, President Harding promised Americans a return
to looking inward, especially with regard to business and economic growth. Funeral bells
began to chime in mourning for lost hopes that the League of Nations would constitute a
viable force to protect international stability.
The return to isolationism which the United States experienced in the aftermath of
debates over the League of Nations would persist throughout the 1920s and even the 1930s,
as proven by the actions of the Nye Committee from 1934 to 1936.29 This commission,
chaired by Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, has acquired a reputation for having been
hostile to American business and having sought to demonstrate that the interests of the
munitions industry pushed the United States into World War I, thus helping to “steer the
United States to an isolationist course.”30 The inflammatory remarks of Nye himself,31 which
enjoyed far more publicity than the actual proceedings of the congressional investigation,
were considered by many people to be the official views of the entire committee. Therefore,
memory of the Nye Committee is linked to ideas about a congressional assault on American
munitions makers in an attempt to prove that they had forced the United States to go to war. 32
However, the aim of the Nye Committee was not to prove that private business
interests had forced the United States to enter World War I, but instead to determine whether
booming conditions in the American munitions industry after August 1914 “had contributed
to the double standard of neutrality which most Committee members believed the Wilson
administration had applied to the two sets of European belligerents.”33 The committee’s
findings ought to have conveyed a lesson to the public and to policymakers involving a
cautious approach to close economic links in war industries (such as munitions) with
belligerent countries in the future.34 However, thanks in large part to Nye’s brash comments
and utter failure to qualify his words as personal opinion and not the official stance of his
commission, historians have found the Nye Committee (and more importantly, Nye himself)
to be partially blameworthy for unchecked German, Italian, and Japanese aggression in the

28

Ibid.

John Edward Wiltz, “The Nye Committee Revisited,” The Historian 23 (No. 2, Feb. 1961): 211.
30
Ibid., 211-212.
31
Ibid., 222-223: “In a national radio address Nye declared, ‘The Committee listened daily to men striving to defend
acts which found them nothing more than international racketeers, bent upon gaining profit through a game of arming
the world to fight itself.’ Few Committee members would have supported this reckless statement, and Nye himself,
more than twenty years later, said that most of the men who had testified before his Committee were honorable
gentlemen. In a speech before the National Education Association at Denver on July 4, 1935, the North Dakota
Republican … declared of the munitions makers: ‘These racketeers go out over this world and build up the hates,
fears, and suspicions that build wars, that drive people into war, and then getting them there, they keep them there as
long as they can.’ The Committee’s evidence could not even partly prove such a claim.”
32
Matthew Ware Coulter, The Senate Munitions Inquiry of the 1930s: Beyond the Merchants of Death (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1997), 127.
33
Wiltz, “Nye Committee,” 227.
34
Wiltz, “Nye Committee,” 227.
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1930s.35 The findings of the commission – coupled, albeit improperly, with Nye’s incendiary
comments – created a (flawed) memory of how the United States became involved in the
Great War. This memory bolstered support for isolationism and thus slowed the American
response to a growing international crisis that would eventually lead to the outbreak of World
War II.36 As public sentiment in Europe – especially in Great Britain37 – turned toward the
belief that the Versailles settlement had rendered Germany a victim of serious injustice, the
stage was set for Hitler’s ascendancy on the continent, facilitated by American isolationism
and a lack of European willpower to enforce the Versailles Treaty.38
From 1919 through the late 1930s, political and diplomatic officials from the Paris
Peace Conference, the White House, and the U.S. Congress were compelled to justify their
visions for the postwar world by offering their own interpretations of how the First World
War should be remembered. In the United States, Woodrow Wilson’s call for international
cooperation through the League of Nations failed to defeat Henry Cabot Lodge’s
conservative isolationism in the court of public opinion and in congressional debate,
culminating in the absence of the United States from the League and the persistence of
American isolationism until the Second World War forever changed U.S. foreign policy. The
resurgence of American isolationism after the First World War, combined with a lack of
determination amongst the democracies of Western Europe to enforce the Versailles
settlement against a rearmed and embittered Germany, would facilitate the successes of
fascist aggression. Thus, the struggle over memory and World War I led directly to the
conditions in which World War II could take place.

35

Coulter, Senate Munitions Inquiry, 128.
Ibid.
37
MacMillan, Paris 1919, 479.
38
Ibid., 478-483.
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